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INTRODUCTION
According to the Milliman 2015 Public Pension Study, the Unfunded Accrued Liability for the
100 largest U.S. public pension plans was $1.20 trillion and the median funded ratio of the
market assets was 71.7% (Sielman, 2015). The ten largest retirement systems made up nearly
40% of the total Accrued Liability (Sielman, 2015). The California Public Employees’
Retirement System (CalPERS), the nation’s largest public retirement system, was included in
this study and had a market value of $301.1 billion in 2015 (CalPERS, 2015a). California State
Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS), the second largest public retirement system listed in
the study, had a market value of $191.4 billion (CalSTRS, 2015). According to the Public Policy
Institute of California, the two plans cover 65% of the four million State, county and local
employees who are members in California’s public retirement systems (Cook, 2015a). Both of
these plans have significant Unfunded Liabilities that contributed to the funding gap described in
the Milliman report. CalPERS reported $93.5 billion of Unfunded Liabilities based on the June
30, 2014 valuation and CalSTRS reported $73.7 billion of Unfunded Liabilities for that same
year (Cook, 2015a).
Local governments provide nearly 60% of the employer’s contribution in the public
pensions (Cook, 2015b) and as the contribution rates continue to rise, the local governments will
be faced with costly bills that will be difficult to afford. Even as the economy improves,
California local governments’ revenues are expected to grow slowly. The Legislative Analyst’s
Office showed a 6.4% growth in 2015-2016 from the prior year for the big three General Fund
revenues (Personal Income Tax, Sales and Use Tax, and Corporation Tax) and then with
projected growth rates of 3.0%, 4.5%, 1.7%, and 2.2% in subsequent years (Legislative Analyst’s
Office, 2015). Increasing taxes and fees, reducing services, and /or borrowing money are some
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of the tools the governments has to pay for the higher pension costs. The State and local
governments in California will be challenged to fund essential services such as public safety and
public schools and still make the required employer contributions for the public pensions as
required by law. A high Net Pension Liability will result in lower credit ratings, and thus it will
be costlier for the governments to borrow money for capital programs and other purposes.
This research will examine from a financial standpoint the financial status of CalPERS’
defined benefit plan only, not the plan’s other post-retirement employee benefits. This report
contains an overview of CalPERS, along with information about Defined Pension Plans and key
legislation and accounting guidelines influencing the public retirement systems. This research
project benchmarked CalPERS against the Teacher Retirement System of Texas, Florida
Retirement System, and the New York State and Local Retirement System, which all have a
Funded Status of over 80%. Significant observations were made about the framework of the four
public retirement systems that can help the CalPERS and the other public retirement systems
achieve a sustainable future.

This research will examine how CalPERS can achieve the

sufficient investment returns necessary to ensure the payout of future benefits to its members at
the appropriate cost to employers and employees.

BACKGROUND

Overview of CalPERS

CalPERS had a total of 1.8 million members, with 48% active members (869,000), 34% retirees
and beneficiaries (611,000), and 18% inactive members (336,000) as of June 30, 2015.
CalPERS’ membership is comprised of three large categories of employees. The classified (non6|Page

teaching) school employees make up the “School” membership (38%); State employees,
including ones from the California State University, make up the “State” membership (31%); and
employees of local governments make up the “Public Agency” membership (31%). Certified
teachers and administrators in K-12 and instructors in community colleges are typically in
CalSTRS. CalPERS is a cost-sharing, multi-employer pension plan and is comprised of the State
of California, along with close to 3,007 employers in California who contract with CalPERS for
their pension and health benefits (CalPERS, 2016a). Examples of employers in this area that
participate in CalPERS are Santa Clara County and almost all cities in Santa Clara and San
Mateo counties, with the exception of San Jose that has its own separate pension system
(CalPERS, 2015a).

The average monthly pension payment for all service retirees in 2014-2015 was $2,627
and these retirees had an average of just over 20 years of service (CalPERS, 2016b). The
monthly payments may be the only source of income for the retirees, as not all public employees
in California are covered by Social Security. The following group of employees do not pay into
Social Security and therefore have no Social Security coverage: California Highway Patrol
(CHP), teachers, state firefighters, correctional officers, and judges, as well as the employees of
more than 450 cities, counties and special districts (Mendel, 2009). The Windfall Elimination
Provision of the Social Security Act states that for the rest of the employees who are covered by
Social Security, the calculation of Social Security benefits may be reduced to avoid “doubledipping”. This would apply if an employee paid into Social Security in a previous employment
and then started a career in the public sector and did not continue to pay into Social Security
while employed in the public sector (CalSTRS, n.d.).
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The assets and liabilities of CalPERS are combined across numerous employers and
multiple generations of employees, and the risks and gains are shared by this pool of long-term
investors. CalPERS is by far the largest public retirement system in California with 38% of the
total assets, followed by CalSTRS with 26%, and University of California’s Defined Benefit
Plan with 7%. The top ten largest public retirement systems make up 88.5% of all systems in
this category. The asset distribution was State, 74.1%; counties, 15.9%; cities, 9.3%; special
districts, 0.6%; and other, 0.1%. Of the 131 public retirement systems that filed their reports
with the State Controller’s Office for 2010-2011, 86 systems were Defined Benefit Plans and 45
were Defined Contribution Plans. There are six statewide pension plans in California, comprised
of CalPERS, CalSTRS, the University of California Retirement System, and the remaining three
plans are small and include judges and legislators. Fiscal year 2010-2011 was the latest Public
Retirement Systems Annual Report available from the State Controller’s Office. (California State
Controller’s Office, 2011).

CalPERS is also the largest public retirement system nation-wide, with $301.1 billion in
assets.

CalSTRS had $191.4 billion of assets and New York State and Local Employees

Retirement System ($184.5 billion) followed closely behind.

The Florida Retirement System

($148.0 billion) was the fourth largest and the Teachers Retirement System of Texas ($127.9
billion) rounded out the top five largest public retirement systems.

Defined Benefits Plans

Retirement benefits are promised for a lifetime in a Defined Benefits (DB) plan. The monthly
DB allowance is calculated by multiplying the employee’s years of service, a benefit factor and
final average salary (highest average in a 12 or 36 months period). The DB formula is set by
8|Page

contract negotiations with the unions and through legislation. The most common formula for the
monthly DB allowance in CalPERS for non-safety members is 2% of the final average salary at
55 years old and for safety members, 3% of the final year salary at 50 years old (CalPERS,
2014a).

In contrast, in a Defined Contribution plan, the only thing promised to the employee is that the
employer will contribute a defined amount each year during employment. This money, along
with the employee’s contribution, is invested in a fund similar to a 401(k) that the employee
controls. The amount the employee receives upon retirement depends on the total amount
contributed and the earnings on the investments. The employee bears the entire risk of the
investments and the responsibility for their management (CalPERS, 2014a).

In a DB plan, the retiree receives a monthly allowance which is guaranteed by the
government and ultimately by the taxpayers. This future cost or Projected Benefit Obligations
(PBO) should be set aside or accrued today
so that the monthly allowances can be paid
to the employee when he retires.

The

liability or PBO is calculated by actuaries
based on the demographics of the employee
group (e.g., average retirement age, life
expectancies, turnover rates, morbidity)

Figure 1 Contribution and investment incomes pay for the pension benefits
Source: CalPERS. (2013). ALM Workshop – Attachment 1 – CalPERS.

and other economic assumptions such as
rate of return, projected rate of inflation, wage increases and promotions (Kilgour, 2013).

The

contributions towards the PBO made by the employer and employees, plus investment income,
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are used to pay for the monthly allowances. Figure 1 shows how this equation is delicately
balanced. Asset Allocation and Actuarial Assumptions are the two components of the Asset
Liability Management that form the base of the equation. The asset allocation of the investments
and the assumptions used to fund the DB plan are critical to ensuring there will be enough funds
available to pay for future benefits. Over the last 20 years, the majority of every dollar spent on
CalPERS pensions came from investments (65 cents), followed by employer contributions (22
cents) and then employee contributions (13 cents) (CalPERS, 2016a).
The employee contributes a fixed percentage of his earnings towards the PBO as does his
employer, who is responsible for paying the Actuarially Determined Employer Contribution
(Employer Contribution) which is a fixed percentage of the covered payroll (Kilgour, 2013).
CalPERS has the authority to adjust the Employer Contribution as needed and to require
employers to pay the full amount of the PBO (Kilgour, 2013). The Employer Contribution is
derived by first calculating the Present Value (PV) of the benefits accrued in a given year and the
administrative costs (also known as the Normal Costs) (Kilgour, 2013). The PV is the current
worth of benefits payable in the future after applying a discount rate for the assumed interest rate
and adjusting for the probability of its payment. Combine the PV with the amortized payments
to make up any Unfunded Liabilities. The amortization is usually between 20 to 30 years
(Munnel & Aubry, 2015). The Employer Contribution continually changes based on the funded
status of the PBO. The Funded Status identifies the value of the assets that are available today to
pay for the future benefits.
One of the biggest challenges for the State, schools, and public agencies in CalPERS is to set
aside enough money for the employer contribution for the pensions. There will be a strain on
local governments’ budgets and their ability to provide essential services. According to John
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Shirley, City Manager of Sacramento, “Our greatest challenge over the next 10 years is dealing
with the $450 million unfunded liability for retired employee health care benefits while at the
same time paying for ever-increasing pension costs imposed by CalPERS” (Spiegel and Hudson,
2015, 3). Four public agencies that contract with CalPERS (cities of Stockton, San Bernardino,
and Vallejo, and town of Mammoth) have declared bankruptcy (CalPERS, 2015b). Other local
governments may be forced to cut services and lay off employees and/or collect higher taxes and
fees to meet the pension obligations or to declare bankruptcy.
Legislature Background
CalPERS, established in 1932, initially had an investment policy that restricted investments to
safe and stable bonds, but this changed in 1966 with the passage of Proposition 1. Proposition 1
gave approval for CalPERS and other California public pension systems to invest 25% of their
assets in blue chip equities. Proposition 84, enacted in 1984, gave approval for CalPERS to
invest in anything prudent. Proposition 162, also known as the California Pension Protection
Act, made three changes to how the public retirement plans were managed, was enacted in 1992.
This Proposition gave the retirement boards exclusive authority over the administration and
investments of the public retirement systems; it specified that the highest priority of the board
was providing benefits to members and their beneficiaries; and stated that the Legislature could
not change the composition and terms of board membership unless approved by a majority
popular vote. The Proposition effectively shifted the power over the public retirement plans
from elected officials and taxpayers to members of the boards. Prior to Proposition 162, elected
officials could redirect funds out of a public pension because there were no State or federal laws
preventing this action, but Proposition 162 put an end to this. SB 400, a major retroactive state
pension increase enacted in 1999, gave enhanced benefits to all State and School employees.
11 | P a g e

These legislative changes have created long lasting impacts on the financial health of the pension
plan and are discussed further in the Literature Review section. (Kilgour, 2014)
California Rule
The California Rule came about as the result of several judiciary decisions regarding public
pensions. This rule states that the pension benefits given to an employee on the date of hire are
protected and public employers cannot change future pension benefits unless the disadvantage to
the participant is offset with something else that is at least comparable as long as the employee is
employed (Kilgour, 2014). This rule makes it very difficult for the employer to implement cost
savings measures such as changing the benefit formula or increasing the Employee
Contributions.
The 2013 Public Employee Pension Reform Act (AB 340) did reduce pension costs;
however, most of the provisions of the Act applied only to employees hired after January 1, 2013
due to the California Rule. The benefit formula for non-safety employees was changed from
2.5% at 55 years old to 2% at 62 years old, with a maximum of 2.5% at 65 years. Three new DB
formulas were created for new safety employees that either reduced the benefit factor and/or
increased the age when the safety employees could retire. In addition to other reforms, the final
compensation is based on a three years average rather than the highest year average and new
employees were required to pay half of the pension’s Normal Costs. The 50-50 split of the
Normal Cost is required for new employees hired by public agencies, California State
University, and schools, as well as judicial and legislative employees. The reform did not require
a Normal Cost split for most State workers, but did encourage this practice going forward.
(CalPERS, 2012)
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GASB 67/68
The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 67/68 statements significantly changed
the financial reporting and accounting requirements for public pension plans and the plan
sponsors beginning with the June 2014 reports. Among other things, it required the use of the
Individual Entry Age Normal Cost Method as the basis for financial reporting, the Net Pension
Liability (NPL) replaced the Net Pension Obligation which is the Actuarial Accrued Liability
(AAL) less Market Value of Assets (MVA, previously it was Actuarial Value of Assets (AVA)).
The smoothing techniques that were used for calculating the AVA cannot be applied to calculate
the MVA (Kilgour, 2013)
The new guidelines also changed how the discount rate is used to convert the PBO to
the Present Value. Public pension plans can continue to use the assumed Rate of Return on
Investments (ROR) as the discount rate for the portion of the liability that is expected to be
covered by the plan assets. The stricter reporting requirements of GASB 67/68 applies to the
retirement systems that project their plan to be insufficient to cover the benefit payments. A
much lower discount rate is used to calculate the present value of the liability that is unfunded.
Using this blended rate increased the unfunded liability and presented a more realistic value of
the funded status of the public pension in comparison to pre-GASB 67/68. The lower discount
rate would be equivalent to the riskless rate of borrowing high-quality municipal bonds to cover
the Unfunded Liability. GASB 67/68 also reduced the amortization periods from up to 30 years
to a period based on the remaining service years of the participants, which is typically 10 to 12
years (Kilgour, 2013).
The combination of using the MVA for the NPL, using a blended rate, and shorter
amortization periods will make the public pension plans appear in worse financial conditions
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compared to pre-GASB 67/68. In addition, for cost-sharing plans such as CalPERS, each
participating employer must now report in their financial statements its proportionate share of the
Unfunded Liability. The financial picture will now be more accurate and it will be clear to the
elected officials, trustees, plan administrators, stakeholders, and the public how much debt is
owed and how it will influence the credit rating of these entities (Kilgour, 2013).
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METHODOLOGY
The research determined how CalPERS’ investment strategy benchmarked against three large
public retirement systems in the United States that have a high funded ratio of assets to unfunded
liabilities:

New York State and Local Employees Retirement System (NYSLRS), Teacher

Retirement System of Texas (TRS), and Florida Retirement System (FRS).

The purpose of

examining the data is to provide objective information to managers and other stakeholders that
will improve the decision-making and performance, in addition to increasing the level of
accountability (Wholey, Hatry, Newcomer, 2004). Table 1 contains data for each of the public
retirement systems based on the following questions:

1. How many members and employers are in this public pension plan? What is the ratio of
actives to retirees/survivors/ beneficiaries?
2. What is the governance structure of the board of trustees?
3. What is the market value of the investments and is there an investment policy? What are
the laws and regulations governing the investments?
4. What is the asset allocation, assumed Rate of Return on Investments, and the actual Rate
of Return on Investments for a 1-year, 5-year, 10-year, 20-year, and 25-year?
5. What is the Actuarial Value of the Assets, Actuarial Accrued Liability and the Unfunded
Actuarial Accrued Liability? What is the Funded Status?

By comparing the four systems, significant observations were made so that CalPERS can be in a
better position to achieve the sufficient investment returns necessary to ensure the payout of
future benefits to its members at the appropriate cost to employers and employees.
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As described in Theodore H. Poister (2008), Measuring performance in public and nonprofit
organizations, the research included the following steps:
1. Identify measures to be used
2. Develop precise definitions of the measures
3. Collect the data from the public pension plans
4. Use the data to assess the various public pension plans
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LITERATIVE REVIEW

Milliman 2015 Public Pension Funding Study

The Milliman 2015 Public Pension Funding Study reviewed the funded status of the 100 largest
U.S. public pension plans. The various plan sponsors’ assessments of the funded status were
included in the report along with Milliman’s own evaluation of the assumed ROR. The assumed
ROR was recalibrated and this resulted in a higher Accrued Liability and the Funded Status for
the aggregate plans. The median assumed ROR decreased from 8.00% in the 2012 study to
7.75% in the 2013 and 2014 studies and then decreased slightly to 7.65% in the 2015 study. The
7.65% was 40 basis points higher than Milliman’s independently evaluated assumed ROR of
7.25%. Using the 7.25% assumed ROR rather than the median 7.65% caused the Accrued
Liabilities to increase by $0.18 trillion, from the report of $4.08 trillion to $4.26 trillion. The
aggregate Accrued Liability reported of $4.08 trillion consisted of $1.67 trillion Accrued
Liability from the 12.5 million active plan members and $2.41 trillion Accrued Liability from the
12.6 million members that had not started to collect their pension. (Sielman, 2015)

The plan sponsors reported the Market Value of the Assets at $3.06 trillion; therefore, the
Unfunded Accrued Liability was $1.20 trillion, compared to the sponsors’ reported $1.02 trillion.
The Funded Ratio of the Market Value of Assets, after using the recalibrated assumed ROR,
decreased the 75.0% reported by the plan sponsors to 71.7%. A comparison of the 2014
recalibrated figure to the 2015 recalibrated figure for this valuation showed an overall increase
from 68.2% to 71.7%. The Funded Ratio based on the Actuarial Value of the Assets and the
recalibrated assumed ROR decreased from the plan sponsors’ reported 72% to 68.9%.
Furthermore, there was also a decrease from 69.4% to 68.9% based on the recalibrated figure
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from last year. For the first time, the number of retired and inactive members was larger than the
number of active members for the 100 public pension plans. A reduction on the assumed ROR
of 100 basis points causes a 12% to 13% increase in the Accrued Liability, which causes a
decrease in the funded status of the public pension plan. In addition, the asset allocations were
70% in non-fixed income and 30% in fixed income. (Sielman, 2015)

Increased Pension Costs
The current state of CalPERS’s Unfunded Liability can be attributed to increased pension costs
from: 1) employers not paying the full amount of the Actuarially Required Contribution; 2)
aggressive investment strategies; 3) enhanced benefits and higher compensation; and 4)
divestment activities.
Funding Holidays
In the 1990s, when more investments were shifted from bonds to equities, the rate of returns
were double-digits and resulted in more than doubling the assets per worker (Pew Charitable
Trusts & Laura and John Arnold Foundation, 2014). This was during the dot-com boom and it
seemed as though the high returns would continue indefinitely. Half of the states had reached
100% funding of their public pension plans by 2000 (Pew Center on the States, 2010).
CalPERS’s investments performed very well during this period; the plan was 101% funded in
1995 and rose to a high of 137.9%. A “funding holiday” was enjoyed by some employers, which
translated into little or no payments made for the employer contributions. For example, the
employer contributions for CalPERS’s State plans was $1.2 billion in 1997-1998 (Funded Ratio
133.9%) and decreased to a low of $156.7 million made by employer contributions in 2000-2001
(Funded Ratio 104.6%). The employer contribution rate increased to $677 million in 2001-2002
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(Funded Ratio 86.9%) and then climbed to $1.2 billion in 2002-2003 (Funded Ratio 79.8%). By
2006-2007, the Funded Ratio was 101.2% and would rise and fall between then and today. The
employer contributions for CalPERS’s State plans has pretty much increased every year
beginning in 2000-2001 until today. (M. Ramirez, personal communication, December 4, 2015).
Not paying the full amount of the Actuarially Determined Contribution had unwanted
consequences for the financial health of the pension system. Michael Travaglini, executive
director of the Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Management Board, stated “you need
to make contributions in all market environments” (Pew Center on States, 2010, 24).
Policymakers must be disciplined and continue making the employer contribution even during
periods of strong returns because the stock market is volatile and unpredictable, and eventually
the day will come when there is another significant market loss.
Enhanced Benefits and Salaries Raises
SB 400, a major retroactive state pension increase enacted in 1999, gave enhanced benefits to all
State and School employees in CalPERS. CalPERS’ pension costs increased when the DB
formula for CHP changed from 2% at 50 years old to 3% at 50 at years old and retirees received
pension increases of 1% to 6% depending on when the person retired (Mendell, 2015c). In
addition, local police were also authorized 3% at 50 years old as part of this bill (Mendell,
2015c). SB 400 was “an opportunity to restore equity among CalPERS members without costing
a dime of additional taxpayer money” said William Crist, the CalPERS board president at the
time. SB 400 increased the base of the pension obligation without much consideration of the
long-term impacts of the change (Mendell, 2015d).
Generous increases in the payroll also resulted in higher pension obligations. Between
1999 and 2009, the number of state employees increased by 39% and the average pay for state
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workers increased by 50%; local government workers increased by 60%, and local safety
workers increased by 69% (Little Hoover Commission, 2011). Benefit enhancements can affect
the pension obligation in the long term and should be carefully considered before the changes are
made.
A Shift to Aggressive Investment Strategies

2

Although
plans

public

are

pension

funded

by

employers’ and employees’
contributions,

investment

earnings are supposed to pay

Figure 2 State public pension investment shift over 30 years.
The Pew Charitable Trusts and Laura and John Arnold Foundation. (2014). State public
pension investment shift over 30 years.

60%

of

the

benefits

(Pew

Charitable Trusts & Laura and

John Arnold Foundation, 2014). As shown in Figure 2, over the past 30 years, public pension
plans shifted their investments from fixed income investments - such as government and
corporate bonds - to riskier investments (Pew Charitable Trusts & Laura and John Arnold
Foundation, 2014). Beginning in the 1980s, investments shifted to equities and in the last decade
alternative investments, such as private equities, hedge funds, real estate and commodities,
became a large percentage of the portfolio for the public pension plans (Pew Charitable Trusts &
Laura and John Arnold Foundation, 2014). There is a high level of risk with the equities and
alternative investments because there is small probability of earning extremely high RORs;
however, there is a very high probability of relatively low or even negative returns since
investments are volatile and the investment loss can be significant. In addition, pension funds
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are exposed to market risks and there is only a 5% chance that the pension will have enough
investment income to meet the needs of the retirees 15 years later (Novy-Marx, R., & Rauh, J.
D., 2009).
The stock market has fluctuated over the last ten years as evidenced by the wide range of
the ROR. The low end of the range was a 23.6% loss in 2009 and the high end was a 20.7% gain
in 2011 followed by a 1% gain in 2012. Even with six out of the last ten years being doubledigit gains, the ROR for CalPERS over a 10-year period was only 6.2%. The 23.6% loss in 2009
had a significant impact on CalPERS’ investments and the assets dropped from $251.2 billion in
2007 to $178.9 billion. Put differently, the Funded Status dropped from 101.2% as of June 30,
2007 to 60.8% in 2009, and the impact could have been much worse had CalPERS not been
nearly fully funded (Mendell, 2014) (M. Ramirez, personal communication, December 4, 2015).
By 2014, the MVA had almost doubled since 2009, yet CalPERS’s investments had only
increased by 68% and had not fully recovered from the Great Recession despite a major bull
market (Mendell, 2015a). There are investment losses to the pension as the gap between the
actual ROR and the assumed ROR widens. This funding gap is reduced by collecting more
revenue through contribution increases unless the investments outperform the assumed ROR in
the ensuing years.
Divestment Activities
Through the years, CalPERS divested its investments based on political motivations, moral
benefits, health, and social goals.

Wilshire estimated that the present value of historical

exclusions to-date due to CalPERS’s divestment activities ranged from a loss of $3.79 billion to
$8.32 billion. A 1987 law during the Apartheid era required divestment of South African
investments, which cost CalPERS an estimated $590 million in 1989. If CalPERS had held onto
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that investment, it would have grown to be somewhere between $1.1 billion to $4.27 billion in
2014.

Divestments of tobacco-related securities, certain Emerging Markets (permissible

countries and principles), companies on the Iran and Sudan lists, and certain firearm-related
companies also caused CalPERS to lose billions of dollars. (Wilshire, 2015)
In October 2015, Governor Brown signed into law Senate Bill 185 the Public Divestiture
of Thermal Coal Companies Act.

Though the California Pension Protection Act gave

CalPERS’s Board of Administration exclusive authority over the investments of the public
retirement systems, the Legislature can prohibit certain investments by retirement boards for the
social good. The bill states that CalPERS and CalSTRS are required to constructively engage
with the publicly traded coal companies in its portfolio to establish whether the coal companies
are transitioning their business models to produce clean energy. CalPERS and CalSTRS boards
would then determine if they would divest its investments. The retirement boards could choose
not to divest its investments if doing otherwise is not consistent with the retirement board’s
fiduciary responsibilities (Calpers, 2015c). According to the California Watchdog.org, “… the
industry [coal] is going through its worst slump in decades and coal companies’ market values
have dropped nearly 90% since 2011” (Nikolewski, 2015). Though CalPERS has a mere 0.03%
or $83 million of its portfolio in coal companies, divesting its investment would mean a financial
loss (Nikolewski, 2015).

Wilshire stated that the generally accepted academic argument

regarding limiting investments had a “deleterious impact on performance over long periods of
time” (Wilshire, 2015).
Unfunded Status of the Plan
Since governments are not required to fully fund public pension plans, there is the danger that
the government has taken on more risk than prudent and this could lead to insolvency or
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bankruptcy.

In the private sector, all current and future liabilities must be funded (1974

Employee Retirement Income Security Act). As of the June 30, 2001 valuation date, the Funded
Status of CalPERS was 104.6%. Since then, it has been slowly decreasing and reached a low of
60.8% in 2009 and then climbed to an estimated 73.3% as of June 30, 2015 valuation (M.
Ramirez, personal communication, December 4, 2015). The average Funded Rate over this 13year period was 82.2%.
The Funded Status of CalPERS was estimated to be 73.3% which is a 3% decrease from
the previous year’s 76.3% due to the actual ROR of 2.4% in 2015. The actual ROR was 5%
lower than the assumed ROR of 7.5% (Borenstein, 2015). Since investment earnings are not
performing at the projected level, this gap must be made up by collecting more revenue through
the increase of the employer contributions and the employee contributions, albeit the latter is
from a limited pool of new employees. Chief Investment Officer Ted Eliopoulos warns that if
the funded status falls below 50%, this would be “a difficult place to climb out if we get there.”
(Borenstein, 2015). CalPERS staff projects that there is a 28% to 35% chance of falling below
the 50% funded status level within the next 30 years (CalPERS, 2015b).
Underfunding affects the financial outlook for an agency and more scrutiny is now given
by the bond rating agencies. Bond rating agencies look at the Unfunded Liabilities associated
with the retirement benefits to determine creditworthiness and financial stability for an agency.
The higher the credit rating, the less an agency pays to borrow money. In 2011, rating agency
Moody’s Investor Service added pension underfunding to an entity’s general indebtedness and
applied a 5.5% discount rate rather than the typical 8% (Kilgour, 2013). Prior to this, Moody’s
used the discount rate reported in the pension plans. Moody’s also changed its methodology and
now uses the MVA and amortizations over 17 years. Previously Moody’s used the AVA and
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amortizations over 30 years to calculate the pension’s Funded Status (Kilgour, 2013). Moody’s
new methodology increased the total pension underfunding from $766 billion to $2.2 trillion and
thus with the revised Unfunded Liability, the employer contributions increased from 2.6% of
revenue to 9.1% (Kilgour, 2013).
The Stability of the Public Pension Plans Continue to be Threatened
A negative cash flow occurs when the payout for the monthly DB allowance is more than the
contributions from employees and employers, and the investments are liquidated to bridge the
gap. In 2013-2014, a total of $17.8 billion was paid from CalPERS to retirees. A negative cash
flow of $5.2 billion resulted when only $12.6 billion was collected from employees ($3.8 billion)
and employers ($8.8 billion) (Petersen, 2015a). Clearly the revenue coming into the fund is not
enough to pay for all the expenses, and the cash flow will only get worse when and if the
following occurs: the next wave of baby boomers retire, the retirees are projected to live longer
or the number of retirees become larger than the active members that are making contributions
into the plan. CalPERS is expected to have negative cash flows over the next fifteen years unless
there are significant increases in the contributions or the ROR is higher than projected (Lamont,
2015).
In 2013 there were 28,588
retirees

compared

retirees

in

2014a).

1999

to

13,780

(CalPERS,

The ratio of active

employees to retirees has been
steadily

declining

and

a

Figure 3 Ratio of Actives to Retirees
Source: CalPERS. (2014b). State actuarial valuation as of June 30, 2014.

24 | P a g e

significant number of baby boomers is expected to retire in the near term. The ratio of workers
to retirees was 2.04 in 2001, and now the ratio
was 1.3 of workers to retirees in 2014 (Figure
3).
This ratio is forecasted to be less than 1 by
2025 and continue to be in the range of 0.6
and 0.8 past 2059 (Figure 4). For a mature
Figure 4 Forecasted Ratio of Actives to Retirees
Source: CalPERS. (2014b). State actuarial valuation as of June 30,
2014.

plan, if the assumed ROR is not achieved, this

will likely cause large swings in the contribution rate since there are not enough active members
contributing in the plan to stabilize the rates and this could lead to insolvency or bankruptcy.
Normally a retirement plan with a mature plan would “derisk” (move risky investments into safer
ones to reduce risk) (Borenstein, 2015). However, CalPERS still has the majority of its assets
allocated to Equity which leaves the employers and its members vulnerable to another financial
collapse. (CalPERS, 2015b)
Ideally, CalPERS should escalate the employer contributions which would increase the
funded status and reduce the risk of the plan. However, employer contribution levels now are at
the highest point and are expected to climb higher still and remain at that level until 2026-2027
and then gradually fall back to the 2014-2015 level almost 20 years later (Mendell, 2014).
According to CalPERS’ State Actuarial Valuation (CalPERS, 2014b), the Employer
Contributions is expected to increase by $487.2 million, from $4.3 billion to $4.8 billion,
between 2014-2015 and 2015-2016. This difference was largely due to new demographic
actuarial assumptions approved in 2014, increases in payroll (salary increases and new
employees), and changes to the amortization and smoothing policy.

The projected employer
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Figure 5 Projected Future Contribution Rates
Source: CalPERS. (2014b). State actuarial valuation as of June 30, 2014.

contribution rate over the next five years will continue to climb as shown in Figure 5, assuming a
7.5% rate of return, all actuarial assumptions are realized, and there are no further changes to the
assumptions, contributions, and benefits of the plan.

There are 62 safety plans and eight

miscellaneous plans that have rates above 50% of payroll (Mendell, 2014).
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FINDINGS

Membership

CalPERS had a total of 1.8 million members, comprised of the non-teaching school employees,
State employees, and employees of local governments.

There were 3,007 employers

participating in the plan as of June 30, 2015. There were 1.3 workers to every retirees, with
868,713 active members compared to 611,078 retirees, survivors, and beneficiaries. All current
employees contributing a portion of their paycheck towards the pension are considered active
employees. Inactive members that are vested but not currently receiving benefits or non-vested
members not considered “active” and were excluded from the ratio. (CalPERS, 2016a).

The Teacher Retirement System of Texas (TRS) had a total of 1.5 million members. The
membership includes employees and retirees of state-supported educational institutions in Texas,
with 1,347 employers participating in the plan. The ratio of actives to retirees was 2.2 with close
to 828,851 active members compared to 377,738 retirees, survivors, and beneficiaries 2. (TRS,
2015)

The Florida State Retirement System (FRS) had 1.0 million members. There were 1,016
employers in the retirement system which included all state, county, district school board, state
college, and state university employers with optional participation of cities, charter schools,
metropolitan planning districts, and special districts in Florida. The ratio of workers to retiree,
survivors, and beneficiaries was 1.5 (626,578 active members compared to 428,685 retirees,
survivors, and beneficiaries). (FRS, 2015a)
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The New York State and Local Retirement Systems (NYSLRS) is comprised of two
different systems administered by the same staff. They are the Employees’ Retirement System
(ERS) and Police and Fire Retirement System (PFRS). The members of ERS work for public
employers in non-teaching positions and include uniformed services personnel, such as
correction officers and sheriffs. Police officers and firefighters make up the membership of
PFRS. Both the ERS and the PFRS do not include any public employers in New York City as
New York City has its own retirement system. There were 1.1 million members in NYSLRS, of
which approximately 1.0 million were in ERS and 68,000 were in PFRS. The number of
employers in NYSLRS was 3,032 and the ratio of active members to retirees was 1.2 with
522,927 active members and 430,308 retirees, survivors, and beneficiaries. (NYSLRS, 2015a)

The Governance Structure of the Boards of Trustees of the Public Pension Systems

The trustees of CalPERS, Teacher Retirement System of Texas, Florida State Retirement System
and New York State and Local Retirement System have similar responsibilities for the respective
pension system such as setting employer contribution rates, authority and responsibility for the
investment of assets, and completing actuarial valuations. The Board of Administration for
CalPERS consists of 13 members who are elected, appointed, or hold office ex officio. Each
board member is elected for a four-year term. Two board members were Governor Appointees,
four members were ex officio (State Treasurer, State Controller, Director of the California
Department of Human Resources, and a designee of the State Personnel Board Representative),
one member was appointed jointly by the Senate Rules Committee and the Speaker of the
Assembly, and the remaining six members were elected by active and retired state and local
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government workers. The Chief Executive Officer is in charge of administering the directions
set by the board and the day-to-day operations. (CalPERS, 2015a)

The Teacher Retirement System of Texas has a nine-member board of trustees with three
trustees directly appointed by the Governor and the remaining trustees are appointed by the
Governor from lists generated by specific groups.

They serve six-year terms.

The

administration of the plan is led by the Executive Director. (TRS, 2015)

The number of trustees is much smaller for the Florida State Retirement System and the
New York State and Local Retirement Systems. The members of these boards are all elected
officials and serving as trustees is part of their job responsibilties. The trustees of the Florida
State Board of Administration consist of the Governor as Chairman, the Chief Financial Officer,
and the Attorney General.

The Governor appoints the Secretary of the Department of

Management Services who appoints the State Retirement Director who manages FRS (FRS,
2015a). The New York State Comptroller is the sole trustee of the New York State and Local
Retirement Systems.

He is responsible for the investment of the assets and leads the

administration of the system (NYSLRS, 2015a).

Investment Guidelines
The CalPERS Public Employees’ Retirement Fund has a market value of $301.1 billion as of
June 30, 2015. CalPERS Total Fund Investment Policy sets forth the investment beliefs and
objectives for its investment program. CalPERS Investment Policy identifies the objectives and
policies of the investment program. The overall objective of the investment program is to
generate returns at the appropriate risk levels to provide benefits to members and their
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beneficiaries over a long-term and according to the law. Specifically, the performance objectives
are 1) achieve a long-term rate of return that meets or exceeds the actuarial rate of return; 2)
maximize the returns for the level of risk taken; 3) achieve a return that exceeds the Policy index;
and 4) invest assets efficiently and effectively.

The California Constitution, Article XVI,

section 17 gives the CalPERS Board the sole fiduciary responsibility over the assets and the
administration of the retirement system. The strategic objectives, specific investment policies,
performance goals and benchmarks, restrictions and responsibilities outlined in the policy are
intended to provide the framework for the management of the assets and enable transparency and
compliance. The Asset Class Allocation section sets the targets and ranges for specific types of
investments. Benchmarks are specified for the various asset classes to see if the investment
strategy is meeting or exceeding the goal. The Investment Risk Management section strives to
find the balance between risk and return, with a large, diversified pool of asset classes (CalPERS,
2016c).
The Teacher Retirement System of Texas’s Pension Trust Fund had a market value of
$127.93 billion as of August 31, 2015.
CalPERS.

The Investment Policy Statement was similar to

The statement defines the roles and responsibilities of the Board, Investment

Division, consultants and advisors. The investment program is structured and managed to
achieve the following objectives 1) control risk through diversification of asset classes and
establishing long-term return expectations and risk; and 2) achieve a long-term rate of return that
exceeds the a) assumed actuarial rate of return adopted by the Board; b) long-term rate of
inflation by an annualized 5%; and c) return of a composite benchmark of the respective longterm normal asset mix.

The retirement plan operates under the provisions of the Texas
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Constitution, Article XVI, Section 67 and Texas Government Code, Title 8, Subtitle C. (TRS,
2014)

The Florida State Retirement System Pension Plan Trust Fund had a market value of
$147.97 billion as of June 30, 2015. The Defined Benefit Plan Investment Policy Statement’s
investment objectives are to provide investment returns sufficient for the plan that ensures timely
payment of benefits to current and future participants and keeps the plan at a reasonable cost.
The long-term investment objective is to earn a compounded return of 5% plus the rate of
inflation per annum over the long run, This was achieved over 20-, 25- and 30-year periods but
not over a 10- or 15-year period. The plan adheres to statutory guidelines mandated by the
Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes Section 215.47. (FRS, 2014).

The New York State Common Retirement Fund in the New York State and Local
Retirement Systems had a market value of $184.50 billion as of March 31, 2015. The General
Investment Policies provides the framework for a well diversified investment program. The
investment income, along with employer and employee contributions, should be sufficient to
fund the current and future benefits of the retirement plan’s participants as they become due.
The Comptroller is bound by provisions set out in the Retirement and Social Security Law
(RSSL), Regulations of the New York State Department of Financial Services, and State
Banking Law. The “legal list”, found in the RSSL and Banking Law, sets limitations on the
quantity and quality of investments that may be held in certain asset classes and the “basket
clause” of the RSSL allows up to 25% of the assets to be invested in areas specifically not
authorized by other statues. (NYSLRS, 2015b)
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Asset Allocations and the Return on Investments
According to CalPERS, the market value of the assets in the Public Employees’ Retirement Fund
(PERF) as of June 30, 2015 was $301.1 billion, with 53.8% of the current allocation in Global
Equity ($162.0 billion), 9.6% in Private Equity ($28.9 billion), 17.6% in Global Fixed Income
CalPERS Asset Allocations
as of June 30, 2015

0.4%
0.4%
5.2%
2.5%

53.8%

10.5%

Global Equity

($53.0 billion), 10.5% in Real

Private Equity

Liquidity ($7.5 billion), 5.2% in

Liquidity

Inflation Sensitive Assets ($15.7

Inflation Assets

billion), and 0.4% in Absolute

17.6%
Absolute Return
Strategies
Total Plan Level

9.6%

Assets ($31.6 billion), 2.5% in

Global Fixed
Income
Real Assets

Return Strategy ($1.2 billion), and
0.4% in Total Plan Level (Figure 6).

Figure 6 CalPERS Asset Allocations
Source: CalPERS. (2015a). 2014-15 comprehensive annual report.

In 2015, the 1-year ROR was 2.4%,

for the 5-year period it was 10.7%, and for the 10-year period, which included the Great
Recession, it was 6.2%. The ROR for the 20-year period was 7.76%. The long-term assumed
ROR for CalPERS’s was 7.5%. (CalPERS, 2015a).

According

to

the

Teacher

Retirement System of Texas 2015
Comprehensive

Annual

Financial

Teacher Retirement System of Texas Asset
Allocations
as of August 31, 2015
2.1%
Global Equity

Report (2015), the market value of the

19.4%

62.7%

Real Return

assets in the Pension Trust Fund as of
August 31, 2015 was $127.9 billion,
with 62.7% of the current allocation in

Stable Value

15.8%

Risk Parity

Figure 7 Teacher Retirement System of Texas Asset Allocations
Source: Teacher Retirement System of Texas. (2015). 2015 comprehensive annual
financial report.
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Global Equity ($80.2 billion), 15.8% in Stable Value ($20.2 billion), 19.4% in Real Return
($24.8 billion), and 2.1% in Risk Parity ($2.7 billion) (Figure 7). In 2015, the 1-year was -0.3%,
the 5-year period it was 9.6%, and the 10-year period was 6.2%.

The long-term assumed ROR

for the fund was 8% (TRS, 2015).

The Florida Retirement System Pension Plan had a market value of $147.97 billion as of
Florida Retirement System Asset Allocations
as of June 30, 2015
0.8%
Global Equity

6.9%
58.1%

8.3%

6.0%

Approximately

58.1% of the asset allocation was in
Global Equity ($86.00 billion), 6%

Private Equity

was in Private Equity ($8.9 billion),

Global Fixed Income

19.8% in Global Fixed Income

Real Estate

19.8%

June 30, 2015.

Strategic
Investments
Cash/Short Term
Securities

Figure 8 Florida Retirement System Asset Allocations
Source: Florida Retirement System. (2015a). Florida retirement system pension plan and
other state administered systems comprehensive annual financial report fiscal year ended
june 30, 2015.

($29.3 billion), 8.3% in Real Estate
($12.3 billion), 6.9% in Strategic
Investments ($10.2 billion), and
0.8% in Cash and Short Term
Securities ($1.2 billion)(Figure 8).

The 1-year ROR was 3.7%, for the 5-year period it was 11.0%, for the 10-year period was 6.6%,
and for the 20-year period it was 8.1%. The long-term assumed ROR for the fund was 7.65%
(FRS, 2015b).

The New York State and Local Retirement System had a market value of $184.5 billion
as of March 31, 2015. Approximately 39.5% of the asset allocation was in Domestic Equity
($72.9 billion), 13.7% was in International Equity ($25.3 billion), 7.5% in Private Equity ($13.8
billion), 21.4% in Global Fixed Income ($39.5 billion), 6.4% in Real Estate ($11.9 billion), 3.5%
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in Absolute Return Strategy ($6.5 billion), 0.7% in Opportunistic Funds ($1.3 billion), 1.9% in
Cash ($3.5 billion), 0.2% in Real Assets ($369,000), and 5.2% in Inflation Indexed Bonds ($9.6
billion) (Figure 9). The 1year ROR was 7.16%, for
the 5-year period it was
10.2%,

for

the

10-year

period it was 7.1%, for the
20-year period it was 8.7%,

New York State and Local Retirement System Asset
Allocations
Domestic Equity
as of March 31, 2015
0.2%

Int'l Equity

5.2%

Private Equity

1.9%
0.7%

39.5%

3.5%
6.4%

Absolute Return Strategy

and for the 25-year period it
was 9.0%.

The long-term

assumed ROR for the fund

Global Fixed Income (Bond, Cash and
Mortgages)
Real Estate

Opportunistic Funds
21.4%

13.7%
7.5%

Cash
Real Assets
Inflation Indexed Bonds

was

7.0%

(NYSLRS,

2015a).

Figure 9 New York State and Local Retirement System Asset Allocations
Source: New York State and Local Retirement System. (2015a). 2015 comprehensive annual financial
report.

Actuarial Information

The MVA is based on the stock market price on a given day if the investments were sold. When
an Actuary uses the MVA to determine the amount Plan Administrators need to set aside to pay
future retirees, the amount may vary greatly from year to year as the stock market fluctuates
from year to year and this cost would be difficult to budget. Therefore, the actuary uses the
AVA, which is an average value of the assets over a period.

The AVA is important in

determining whether the plan will meet its future Net Pension Liability. Actuarial valuation
methods and assumptions, chosen by the Trustees, are used to smooth out the effects of the shortterm volatility in the market value of assets. The AVA tends to lag behind the markets and can
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be different from the MVA when there are large market movements. The ratio of AVA to MVA
measures the extent to which the public pension plans have experienced overall market gains or
losses over time. If the ratio is over 100%, the market has experienced more losses than gains;
whereas if the ratio is under 100%, it means there have been more gains than losses. (Sielman,
2015)

The Actuarial Accrued Liability (AAL) represents the portion of the present value of
fully projected benefits of service credits earned as of the valuation date.

The Unfunded

Actuarial Accrued Liability (UAAL) is the excess, if any, of the Actuarial Accrued Liability less
the Actuarial Value of Assets. The UAAL represents the PV of the benefits earned that are not
covered by the current plan assets. The Funded Ratio refers to the percentage of the current plan
assets that would cover the future pension benefits. The ratio is calculated by diving the AVA by
the AAL (Sielman, 2015).
The CalPERS’ AVA was $301.3 billion and the AAL was $394.7 billion as of June 30,
2014 valuation. During that same period, the UAAL was $93.5 billion and the Funded Ratio for
the plan was 76.3% (CalPERS, 2015a).

The AVA for the Teacher Retirement System of Texas was $133.5 billion and the AAL
was $166.5 billion. The UAAL was $33.0 billion and the Funded Ratio for the plan was 80.2%.
The actuarial funding method is the Individual Entry Age Normal Cost Method. (Gabriel Roeder
Smith & Company, 2015)

The AVA for the Florida Retirement System was $143.2 billion and the AAL was $165.5
billion. The UAAL was $22.3 billion and the Funded Ratio for the plan was 86.5%. If the
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pension plan had adhered to the financial reporting requirements established by GASB and used
the MVA and the Individual Entry Age Normal for its calculations, the Unfunded Liability
would have been much lower ($12.9 billion compared to $22.3 billion). The actuarial funding
method used for the calculation was the Ultimate Entry Age Normal Cost Method. (FRS, 2015a)

The AVA for the New York State and Local Employees’ Retirement System was $184.2 billion
and the AAL was $196.5 billion. The UAAL was $12.4 billion and the Funded Ratio for the
plan was 93.7% (Dutcher, 2015).
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ANALYSIS
Membership – Three of the Four Pension Plans are Nearing Maturity Levels

All four public pension plans had over one million members and were multi-employer pension
plans. CalPERS by far had the most members and employers with 1.8 million members and
3,007 employers followed closely by TRS (1.5 million members, 1,347 employers), NYSLRS
(1.07 million, 3,032 employers), and then FRS (1.03 million, 1,016 employers). The ratio of the
total number of active employees to the total number of retirees, survivors, and beneficiaries
showed that NYSLR has the lowest ratio of 1.2 followed closely by the 1.3 ratio for CalPERS
and 1.5 ratio for FRS. A ratio at or below ones indicates a more mature plan. Not only is the
public pension plan responsible for paying benefits to a higher number of retirees, the number of
active members making contributions is smaller. The monthly allowances to the retirees are
funded by employer and employee contributions and earnings from investments. If the actual
ROR is lower than the assumed ROR, this gap must be made up by higher contributions from
employers and employees. Higher employer contribution rates could lead to service level cuts
for the public agency or even bankruptcy. The negative impact increases further if the financial
market collapses and the investments were not diversified. It is expected that with the pending
retirement of the baby boomers, this ratio will only get smaller unless there are significant
increases in the number of new members entering the pension plan. However, due to retirement
reforms such as the 2013 Public Employee Pension Reform Act, new members will most likely
be hired in at a lower benefit level. This lower benefit tier will have little to no Unfunded
Liabilities so the contribution rates will be low or the new member may be enrolled in a Defined
Contribution Plan. The savings realized by the employer due to the lower contribution rates is
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required to be to be allocated to the Unfunded Liability, subject to the appropriation in the annual
budget (CalPERS, 2016d). TRS had more than double the number of active members compared
to retirees, beneficiaries, and survivors which indicated the pension plan is not reaching a
maturity level.

It is not surprising that three out of the four public pension plans are nearing maturity
levels since their assets are by far much larger than the other 96 public pension plans included in
the Milliman 2015 Annual Study on Public Pension Funding (Sielman, 2015). The MVA for
each of the four public pension plans was over $100 million and the number of active members
exceeded 400,000. There were no other public pension plans that met either of these two criteria
with the exception of CalSTRS which met both criteria. However, CalSTRS Funded Status was
below 70% in 2015 and therefore not benchmarked in this research (CalSTRS, 2015).
Governance Structure – Appointed Versus Elected and Term Limits

Both FRS and NYSLRS had only elected officials that served as trustees of their boards. This is
different from CalPERS and TRS where the Governor appointed directly or indirectly the
majority of the board members. The board members would be held accountable by its members
if the position was elected rather than appointed. If the board member is not doing a good job,
the person would not be re-elected. The process is more democratic if the membership decides
who will represent them. The majority of the board members are stakeholders that currently
receive or will receive a pension upon retirement. It would seem that the interest of the pension
plan’s membership is best served when the board members are elected by membership rather
than appointed by the Governor.

However, appointed board members may have some

advantages too. Perhaps the appointed board member will be more concerned with long-term
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sustainability of the public pension plan if this person does not have to be concerned with getting
re-elected and doing what the people currently want. The hybrid governance structure that
CalPERS has is more tipped to the politicians since only six out of the 13 board members are
elected by the membership and the rest are appointed. Adding board members who have the
financial expertise, are not stakeholders nor appointed is something that could be explored in
future research.
The CalPERS’ board members serve for a four-year term with no term limits. There are
also no term limits for the President or committee chairs. The President and Vice President are
elected annually for a one-year term and the current President, Rob Feckner, has been elected for
12 consecutive years as the President. In 2016, CalPERS’ governance committee sought to
change the term limits and it was Rob Feckner’s vote that became the deciding vote when he
voted against term limits (Mendell, 2016). Term limits is another area that should be explored in
future research.

Guidelines for Investment Vary Significantly Among Pension Plans

CalPERS Investment Policy, which is 62 pages long, was comprehensive and clearly
documented the objectives and policies for its investment program. CalPERS was the only
pension plan that adopted ten Investment Beliefs which provides a framework for the strategic
management of the investment portfolios and provides context of the organizational priorities.
It was the only guideline that described in detail the frequency and types of report that the
Investment Office staff, General Pension Consultants, and the Private Asset Class Board
Investment Consultants must provide. For example, the Investment Office staff must report the
asset class allocations relative to their target and ranges, as well as investment performance
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returns and any deviations from the policy range at the next Committee meeting or sooner if
deemed necessary. Therefore, on a monthly basis the Investment Committee receives a report
from the Investment Office staff about asset allocation, risk, and investment performance. These
updates are important and will help the trustees perform their fiduciary duties. CalPERS also
listed in detail the investment responsibilities and expectations for the Investment Committee,
Investment Office staff, Actuarial Office staff, External Manager and consultants.

TRS Policy Statement was contained in 46 pages and included information similar to
CalPERS’ with less details. NYSLRS and FRS had relatively short general guidelines, 16 pages
and 9 pages respectively. NYSLRS guidelines were unique in that there was a “legal list” which
set limitations on the quality and quantity of investments in certain asset classes (mainly Fixed
Income and Equity).

Additionally, a “basket clause” provides much flexibility for the

investments since up to 25% of the assets could be invested in areas not specifically authorized
by any other provision of law (e.g., alternative investments such as hedge funds, commodities,
private equity and international bonds that are typically more risky than stocks and bonds and
have higher fees). The State Comptroller of New York must follow the “prudent person” and
“exclusive benefit” fiduciary standards and there are policies and practices in place to ensure that
the fund is managed to ethical standards and the actions are transparent. Hence, NYSLRS
guidelines included Ethical Standards whereas no other pension plans benchmarked did.

There was a bill to increase the basket clause percentage from 25% to 30% to mitigate
market volatility while maintaining high returns. The N.Y. Legislature approved the bill in June
2014; however, the Governor vetoed it (Steyer, 2014). Increasing the percentage of investments
allowed under the “basket clause” would have given the Comptroller too much flexibility and
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further increased the risk for alternative investments that are typically more difficult to value and
monitor.

CALPERS’ Asset Allocations Today Are Similar to Its Asset Allocation Before the Stock
Market Crash in 2008

CalPERS holds close to 63% in Equity as of June 30, 2015 which was very similar to the 66% of
the Equity investments held as of June 30, 2007. In 2006-2007, the stock market had a strong
performance and the ROR for Equity was 23.7% (2015 CAFR, 2015 and 2007 CAFR, 2007).
Despite huge losses related to the subprime lending market in spring 2007, the stock market
continued to climb and the Dow Jones Industrial Average reached a closing high in October
2007.

Eventually the market began to plummet and by December 2007, the United States had

fallen into a recession. The market continued to decline until it reached a low in October 2008
(Kosakowski, n.d.). The 2008 CAFR reported that 61.7% of the asset allocations were in Equity
as of June 30, 2008 and since there were significant losses in Global Equity, the ROR was a loss
of 9% for this asset class (CalPERS, 2008). The 2009 CAFR reflected the largest impact of the
stock market crash of 2008 with a ROR in Equity of -28.6%, with 55.6% invested in this asset
class (CalPERS, 2009).

According to one financial strategist, Albert Edwards, recent events

make him believe that the “world is headed for a disaster, and will take the prices of equities
down with it.” (Matthews, 2016) Edwards predicts the U.S. stock market will plunge as much as
75%. The stock market is cyclical and when the next stock market crash occurs, if CalPERS
continues to have a majority of its investments in Equity, the MVA will decrease significantly
during the next stock market crash and it will be very difficult for the public pension plan to
rebound.
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Categorizing the Risk of the Asset Allocations
CalPERS’ Investment Committee attended the 2013 Asset Liabilities Management Workshop
and reviewed the asset classes and risk factors framework (CalPERS, 2013). The risk factors
(low, moderate, and high) associated with the asset classes were used to categorize the
investments of the four pension plans, resulting in an analysis that showed the overall risk of the
public pension plans.

Over 93% of the asset classes owned by CalPERS, TRS, FRS and

NYSLRS were categorized for the risk analysis. A few of the asset classes were not included in
the analysis because the risk associated with the particular asset class could not be easily defined
unless more research was performed on the particular holdings in the asset class. Total Plan
Level, Risk Parity, Strategic Investments, and Opportunistic are examples of the asset classes
excluded from the risk analysis as the investments could potentially be diversified among various
asset classes. Investments in equities (e.g., Global Equity, Private Equity, Domestic Equity)
were considered high risk; Real Assets, Inflation Assets, Real Return, and Real Estate were
considered moderate risk; and Global Fixed Income, Inflation Indexed Funds, Liquidity,
Absolute Return Strategies, Stable Value, Cash/Short Term Securities were considered low risk.
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Majority of Asset Allocation in High/Moderate Risk Categories

CalPERS
TRS
FRS
NYSLRS

High

Moderate Low

63.40%
62.70%
64.16%
60.70%

15.70%
19.41%
8.30%
6.60%

20.5%
15.8%
20.6%
28.5%

% of Total
Allocation
99.60%
97.88%
93.09%
95.80%

Table #1 Asset Allocations in Risk Categories and Percent of Total Allocation
Source: CalPERS. (2015a). 2014-15 comprehensive annual report.
Florida Retirement System. (2015a). Florida retirement system pension plan and other state administered systems
New York State and Local Retirement System. (2015a). 2015 comprehensive annual financial report
Teacher Retirement System of Texas. (2015). 2015 comprehensive annual financial report.

.
CalPERS
had 79.1% of its assets allocation in high/moderate risk investments, with 63%

invested in high risk (53.8% Global Equity and 9.6% Private Equity). Approximately 20.9% of
CalPERS’ assets were considered low risk. In 2015, CalPERS’ assets had a very low ROR of
comprehensive annual financial report fiscal year ended june 30, 2015.

2.4%. TRS had a similar allocation with 82.1% of the assets considered high/moderate risk, with
Teacher Retirement System of Texas. (2015). 2015 comprehensive annual financial report.

62.7% invested in Global Equity (i.e., U.S., Non-U.S. Developed, Emerging Markets,
Directional Hedge Funds, Public Equity, and Private Equity). At most 16.0% of TRS’s assets
srouce

were invested in what is considered low risk. This strategy brought a loss of 0.3% over the oneyear period.

In contrast, although NYSLRS had approximately the same percentage of high risk
assets, the percentage of low risk investments was at least 28.5% of the portfolio. With the
exclusion of the Absolute Return Strategy, the 28.5% allocated in low risk was considerably
higher than the other three public pension plans. This strategy also provided the highest one-year
ROR of the group at 7.2%. Investing in Fixed Income, considered as low risk, is considered to
be a sound investment strategy because it has historically been less volatile than equities, there is
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income generation, and it diversifies the assets allocation. It was difficult to compare FRS to the
other three public pension plans because of the inability to determine the risk level of the
Strategic Investments. This asset class is approximately 7% of the asset allocation and if it were
considered moderate/high risk, then the asset allocation would be very similar to CalPERS with a
79%/ 20% split. If Strategic Investments was considered low risk, the makeup would be similar
to NYSLRS with a 72%/ 27% split.

Rate of Return on Investments are More Likely to Meet or Exceed the Assumed Rate in the
Long Run

CalPERS
TRS
FRS
NYSLRS

1 year
2.4%
-0.3%
3.7%
7.2%

Rate of Return on Investments
5-year
10-year
20-year
25-year
10.7%
6.2%
7.8%
N/A
9.6%
6.2%
7.7%
8.7%
11.0%
6.9%
8.1%
8.7%
10.2%
7.1%
8.7%
9.0%

Long Term
Assumed
Rate of
Return
7.5%
8.0%
7.7%
7.5%

Table #2 Rate of Return on Investments
The box is shaded if the Rate of Return exceeded the Assumed Rate of Return over a 10-year period
Source: CalPERS. (2015a). 2014-15 comprehensive annual report.
Florida Retirement System. (2015a). Florida retirement system pension plan and other state administered systems
New York State and Local Retirement System. (2015a). 2015 comprehensive annual financial report
Teacher Retirement System of Texas. (2015). 2015 comprehensive annual financial report.

Looking at the RoRs from a long-term perspective (i.e., 10+ years) revealed that none of the four
public pension plans exceeded the long-term assumed ROR for the 10-year period. The actual
10-year ROR for the four pension plans ranged from 6.2% to 7.1%. CalPERS and NYSLRS had
the lowest assumed ROR among the group yet the assumed ROR was not low enough to be less
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than or equal to the actual ROR over the 10-year period. CalPERS, FRS, and NYSLRS both fell
short of the assumed ROR (130 basis points, 80 basis points 30 basis points, respectively). Over
a 20 year period, CalPERS, FRS, and NYSLRS exceeded the assumed RoR over a 20-year
period for and TRS, FRS and NYSLR exceeded the assumed ROR over a 25-year period.
NYSLRS changed their long-term assumed ROR to 7.0% effective September 2015. NYSLRS
had the highest ROR over the 10-year period and now has the lowest assumed ROR.

When the actual ROR varies from the assumed ROR, this causes more financial strain on
the public pension plan. For example, the CalPERS investments in 2015 should have earned
$22.6 billion based on the assumed 7.5% return and the $301.1 billion MVA. However, the
actual return was 2.4%. The difference between the assumed and actual ROR was approximately
$16 billion or 5.3% of the MVA. Therefore, if there were no smoothing efforts, in order to make
up for the previous year’s losses, the target for the following year would be increased from 7.5%
to 12.8% (Ring, E 2016). This process of smoothing out market ups and downs, that is, using the
investment gains/losses from a particular year to offset the investment gains/losses from a nearby
year, ensure that the contribution rates don’t vary greatly from year to year if the actual ROR is
not equal to the assumed ROR. However, smoothing also makes it difficult to identify the
financial position of the pension plan at a given point in time.

A sensitivity analysis of the assumed ROR was performed on the State Miscellaneous
Tier 1 in CalPERS. The assumed ROR is currently at 7.5% and if this rate reduced by 1%, the
Employer Contribution rate would increase from 25.1 % to 36.1% and the Funded Status would
decrease from 72.0% to 64.5%.

If the assumed ROR increased by 1.0%, the Employer

Contribution would decrease from 25.1% to 15.2% and the Funded Status would increase from
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72.0% to 80.6%. The 1.0% increase in the assumed ROR seems like a win-win for cash strapped
agencies since the Funded Status increases and the contribution amount decreases. However, if
the actual ROR is less than the assumed ROR, the funding gap gets larger and larger and this
could eventually lead to bankruptcy (CalPERS, 2014b).

In 2015 CalPERS proposed to slowly shift risky investments into more conservative
investments to increase the financial stability of the pension system (Mendell, 2015b). By
decreasing the assumed ROR from 7.5% to 6.5% over 20 to 30 years, some of the investments
could be shifted to less risky ones. This action would reduce the risk somewhat of another big
loss when the next economic downturn occurs and reduce the risk of spikes in contribution rates.
However, these lower assumed investment returns must be offset by an increase to the Employer
Contribution over a period of time unless the market performs exceptionally better than projected
(Mendell, 2015b). The rate increase for the employer contribution would be added to the 50%
rate increase implemented earlier in 2015 (Petersen, 2015b). For example, the State’s portion of
the Employer Contribution is expected to increase above current levels by $200 million in 20162017 and more than $700 million by 2019-2020 (The Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2015).
Although Governor Brown has no authority over the CalPERS Board, the Governor advocated
that CalPERS act more aggressively by lowering the assumed ROR over five years and
amortizing it over 20 years (Mendell, 2015a). This five- year phased-in approach would have
caused the State’s contribution to increase by more than $1 billion by 2020s (The Legislative
Analyst’s Office, 2015). In November 2015, the Board approved the Risk Mitigation Policy,
reducing the assumed ROR from 7.5% to 6.5% over 20 years, as well as adjusting the strategic
asset allocation target only in years of good investment returns where actual investment returns
outperformed the existing discount rate by at least four percentage points (Petersen, 2015b). The
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policy is a step in the right direction; it will increase the financial sustainability of the pension
system by gradually lowering the risks of the investments over several years.

The Funded Ratio of CalPERS is Much Lower than Benchmarks

CalPERS had an Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability of $93.5 billion and a Funded Ratio of
76.3% as of the June 30, 2014 valuation. The Funded Ratio was estimated to drop to 73.3% as
of the June 30, 2015 valuation. By comparison, NYSLERS had a Funded Ratio of 93.7%, the
highest of the benchmark group. NYSLERS’ ROR was the highest compared to the three other
public pension plans for all the periods except for the 10-year period which the actual ROR was
over 10%. There were 21 years out of the 35 years (1981-2015) where the ROR for NYSLERS
were double-digits and only three years had a negative return (2001, 2003, and 2009). Clearly
NYSLERS investments had solid gains which boosted the funded ratio of the plan. NYSLERS
was consistent about making contributions. Between 2005 and 2014, the contributions remained
at similar levels or increased for all the years except for 2008. FRS followed next with an 86.5%
funded ratio and then TRS which had an 80.2% funded ratio.

CONCLUSION

CalPERS ratio of active employees to retirees, beneficiaries and survivors is 1.3. More of its
members will be beginning their retirement years in the near future and CalPERS must embrace
its fiduciary duties and ensure that investments generate returns at the appropriate risk levels to
provide benefits to members and their beneficiaries over a long-term. CalPERS should allocate a
higher percentage of its asset allocation to Fixed Income. This investment strategy would be
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similar to NYSLRS, which was demonstrated in this paper as a retirement system that was
financially solid and well funded. The actuarial assumptions used for CalPERS, particularly the
assumed ROR, cannot be overly optimistic and unattainable.

CalPERS must be more proactive in securing financial stability for its plan and its membership.
The current funded status is at a tipping point and could drop even lower should there be another
market downturn. The trustees, elected officials, plan administrators and union leaders must
identify ways to increase the employer and employee contributions, reduce the assumed Rate of
Return, and still provide essential services to the community while compensating the employees
in a fair manner. Employees must understand how they share the risk of the unfunded status and
what concessions they can make to contribute towards financial stability. All stakeholders must
work together to ensure the best retirement package is available today and for future generations
to come.
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Table 3 Benchmark of CalPERS against the Teachers Retirement System of Texas, Florida State Retirement System, and New York State and
Local Employees Retirement Systems.

Benchmark
Number of members

CALPERS
1.8 million

Teacher Retirement
System of Texas
1.5 million

Florida State
Retirement System
1.0 million

New York State and Local
Retirement Systems
1.1 million
Two different retirement
systems: Employee
Retirement System with
approximately 1 million
members and the Police and
Fire Retirement System with
just over 68,000 members

Number of employers
participating in the plan

3,007

1,347

Ratio of actives to
retirees/survivors/
beneficiaries

1.3

Governance Structure of
the board

13 members who are
elected by membership,
appointed by the Governor
or Legislature, or hold
office ex officio.
$301.1 billion

9 trustees who are chosen
directly or indirectly by
the Governor

Governor as Chairman,
Chief Financial Officer,
and Attorney General

$128.0 billion

$147.97 billion

$184.5 billion

CalPERS Total Fund

Investment Policy

Defined Benefit

General Investment Policies

2.2

1,016

3,032

1.5

1.2

Comptroller

What is the Market
Value of the
Investments?
Is there an Investment
Policy?
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Benchmark

CALPERS
Investment Policy
(adopted March 16, 2016
and effective April 18,
2016)

Laws and Regulations
Governing the
Investments

Ca Constitution, Article
XVI, section 17

Teacher Retirement
System of Texas
Statement (effective
October 2014)

Texas Constitution, Article Florida Constitution
XVI, Section 67 (a)(3) and and Florida Statutes
Section 825.301,
Section 215.47
Government Code, Title 8,
Subtitle C

New York State and Local
Retirement Systems
November 2015

Retirement and Social
Security Law, Regulations of
the New York State
Department of Financial
Services, and State Banking
Law

Refer to the Findings section of the paper

Asset Allocation
Assumed Rate of Return
on investments

Florida State
Retirement System
Investment Policy
Statement (effective
March 2014).

7.5%

8%

7.65%

7.5%
7.0% as of 9/2015

Rate of Return on Investment
1-Year Return

2.4%

5-Year Return

10.7%

10-Year Return

-0.3%

3.7%

7.2%

9.6%

11.0%

10.2%

6.2%

6.2%

6.9%

7.1%

20-Year Return

7.8%

7.7%

8.1%

8.7%

25-Year Return

N/A

8.7%

8.7%

7.5%
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Benchmark

CALPERS
$301.3 billion1

Teacher Retirement
System of Texas
$133.5 billion

Florida State
Retirement System
$143.2 billion

New York State and Local
Retirement Systems
$184.2 billion

Actuarial Value of Assets
Actuarial Accrued
Liability

$394.7 billion1

$166.5 billion

$165.5 billion

$196.5 billion

Unfunded Actuarial
Accrued Liability
Funded Status based on
Actuarial Value of the
Assets

$93.5 billion1

$33.0 billion

$22.3 billion

$12.4 billion

76.3% as of 6/30/2014

80.2%

86.5%

93.7%

The ratio is estimated to
drop to 73.3% as of
6/30/2015

Source:
CalPERS. (2015a). 2014-15 comprehensive annual report.
Florida Retirement System. (2015a). Florida retirement system pension plan and other state administered systems comprehensive annual financial
report fiscal year ended june 30, 2015.
New York State and Local Retirement System. (2015a). 2015 comprehensive annual financial report.
Teacher Retirement System of Texas. (2015). 2015 comprehensive annual financial report.

1

June 30, 2014 was the last actuarial valuation performed for CalPERS
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